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CASE COMMENT
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES:
THE-TIMES-THEY-ARE-A-CHANGIN'
OR TECHNOLOGY ISSUE AVOIDANCE
City of Ontario, CaL v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010)
Michael Hrdlicka*
I. FACTS
Petitioner, the Ontario Police Department, provided text message
capable pagers restricted to a monthly character limit to its officers.'
Officers who went over the character limit paid any overage charges. 2
After several months of overage charges, Petitioner audited records of
the text messages to determine whether the character limit was
sufficient for normal work use, or if the overage charges resulted from
non-work messages.3 Petitioner allegedly disciplined Respondent,
Officer Jeff Quon, after viewing text messages from his pager.4
Respondent brought action against Petitioner for a Fourth
Amendment violation in the U.S. District Court,5 and the District Court
67
entered judgment in favor of Petitioner. Respondent appealed,7 and the
* Michael Hrdlicka is a 2L at the University of Florida Levin College of Law. He lives
in Gainesville with his fianc6e and two dogs.
1. City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2625 (2010). Petitioner contracted with
Arch Wireless to provide service for the pagers. Id. Pagers were primarily given out to the
Police Department's SWAT team, of which Respondent was a member. Id.
2. Id. "Duke suggested that Quon could reimburse the City for the overage fee rather
than have Duke audit the messages." Id
3. Id. at 2626.
4. Id. On average, Respondent sent or received 28 messages per day. Id. Only 3 of these
were work related messages. Id. In addition, many of the text messages sent by Respondent
were sexually explicit. Id. The majority of the text messages sent or received by Respondent
were from his wife, from whom he was separated, another Police Department employee, with
whom he was romantically involved, and another member of the Police Department SWAT
Team. Id.
5. Id. Respondent also brought action against Arch Wireless, the company the Police
Department had contracted with to provide service for the pagers. Id. Respondent raised these
claims under the Stored Communications Act (SCA), alleging that Arch Wireless violated the
SCA when it turned over the transcripts of Respondent's messages to Petitioner. Id. However,
Respondent lost this claim on summary judgment. Id.
6. Id. at 2627. The district court entered this judgment after a jury concluded that
295
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Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed in part, holding that while
Respondent had a reasonable expectation of privacy, Petitioner's search
was not reasonable. The Supreme Court of the United States granted
certiorari. 9
HELD, Petitioner's search was reasonable and did not violate the
Fourth Amendment.' 0
II. HISTORY
In Burdeau v. McDowell, the Supreme Court declared the Fourth
Amendment to apply not only to police activity, but to any government
activity." Respondent brought action against Petitioner, a Special
Assistant to the Attorney General of the United States, for the return of
documents in Petitioner's possession.12 The Court stated emphatically
that the Fourth Amendment restrained any actions of sovereign
authority.13 The Court continued that even though Petitioner was not a
police officer, if Petitioner had taken Respondent's belongings from his
office, Petitioner's actions would fall under the Fourth Amendment.14
In O'Connor v. Ortega, the Supreme Court tackled searches by
government employers.' The Court held that a Fourth Amendment
search would be upheld when it is reasonable at its inception, as well as
later in its scope of intrusion. 16 Respondent, an employee of a state
hospital, filed suit against Petitioner, his employer, after Petitioner
searched Respondent's office and seized personal items that were later
used in Respondent's discharge.' 7 Petitioner allegedly entered
Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 2633.
11. Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465,476 (1921).
12. Id. at 470. Respondent's documents were taken by his former employer after an agent
of his employer seized his office and broke into a safe contained therein. Id. at 470-71. The
documents were then given to Petitioner in order to help further the case against Respondent. Id.
13. Id. at 475.
14. Id. Ultimately, the Court ruled that because Petitioner obtained the documents by the
release of a third party, there were no grounds for an illegal search. Id.
15. O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 712 (1987).
16. Id.
17. Id. at 713. The items obtained by the search were a Valentine's Day card, a
photograph, and a book of poetry sent to Respondent. Id. Hospital officials later used this
evidence to impeach the credibility of the sender in Respondent's disciplinary proceedings. Id.
Among the other items seized by the search were billing documents of one of Respondent's
private patients. Id.
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Respondent's office with the intent to inventory and secure state
property.18 This action is usually taken after an employee has been
dismissed, yet at the time, Respondent was on administrative leave.1 9 At
trial, both parties gave evidence which showed that Petitioner's
intentions may have been to conduct a search to investigate violations of
workplace rules. 2 0
The Court concluded that an employee's legitimate expectation of
privacy must be balanced with the 2Fovernment's need to oversee
efficient operation of the workplace. Because of the need for this
balance, the Court ruled that a warrant should not be required for a
government employer to carry out everyday activities. 22 Instead, the
Court allowed an employer's intrusions to be judged by a standard of
reasonableness. 23 For an investigatory intrusion, the Court required
reasonable grounds that the search would turn up evidence of workrelated misconduct.24 For a non-investigatory intrusion, there must be
reasonable grounds for a work-related purpose.2 5 Any intrusion, the
Court clarified, must not stray too far from its purpose or it will be
excessively intrusive. 26 Due to the controversy over Petitioner's search,
the Court remanded the case for resolution on that issue.27

18. Id. Although hospital officials alleged that this was the primary focus of the intrusion,
the investigators did not separate state property from Respondent's personal property. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. Investigators never made a formal inventory of the property in the office. Id. at
714. Instead, all of the documents contained in the office were simply put into boxes and placed
in storage for later retrieval. Id.
21. Id. at 725.
22. Id. at 722. "In our view, requiring an employer to obtain a warrant whenever the
employer wished to enter an employee's office, desk, or file cabinets for a work-related purpose
would seriously disrupt the routine conduct of business. . . ."Id. The Court also later stressed the
difference in goals involving potential searches by employers and police. Id. at 724. Police
investigators require probable cause for their searches, but that standard would require too much
of employers who simply want to increase workplace efficiency. Id. "The delay in correcting the
employee misconduct caused by the need for probable cause rather than reasonable suspicion
will be translated into tangible and often irreparable damage to the agency's work, and
ultimately to the public interest." Id.
23. Id. at 725.
24. Id. at 724-25. The Court pointed out that even though the nature of the intrusion may
be investigatory in nature, it is a far cry from the interest involved in an investigation carried out
by law enforcement. Id. at 724. Employers are not necessarily looking to enforce criminal law.
Id. Instead, they are simply focused on improving the efficiency of the workplace by rooting out
any misfeasance or mismanagement of their employees. Id
25. 1d. at 725.
26. Id. at 726.
27. Id. at 729.
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Next, the Court in Olmstead v. United States considered the claim
that wiretapping violated the Fourth Amendment. 28 In considering this,
the Court held that because wiretapping did not seize any physical
object, wiretapping did not constitute an illegal search. 2 9 The Court
defined an illegal search as the misuse of governmental force to search
or seize a person's belongings. 30 A wiretap, the Court concluded, did
not resemble that misuse of power. 3 1 The Court emphasized that an
illegal search must be a search of material things. 32 Because wiretapping
did not search or seize any material thing, the Court held that it was not
an illegal search.3 3
Later, however, the Court overruled this decision in Katz v. United
States.3 4 In this case, the Court in Katz focused on the idea that the
Fourth Amendment protected people and not simply properties from the
government. 35 Thus, the Court held that an illegal search is possible
even without physical intrusion.36
With facts very similar to those of Olmstead, the Court in Katz relied
upon whether the petitioner could have expected privacy in his
actions.3 7 Because one can easily expect that someone who places a
phone call assumes that call to be private, the Court held the search was
illegal.3 8

III. INSTANT

CASE

In the instant case, the Court applied the rule from O'Connor.39
However, the Court declined to address whether Quon had a reasonable

28. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 455 (1928).
29. Id. at 464-66.
30. Id. at 463.
31. Id. at 464. "The amendment does not forbid what was done here. There was no
searching. There was no seizure. The evidence was secured by the use of the sense of hearing
and that only." Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 464-66.
34. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id at 351. In both cases, investigators had amassed evidence after placing wiretaps on
phones used by the defendants. See id. at 348; Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 455.
38. Katz, 389 U.S. at 352-53. "One who occupies [a phone booth], shuts the door behind
him, and pays the toll that permits him to place a call is surely entitled to assume that the words
he utters into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the world." Id.
39. City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2628 (2010).
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expectation of privacy as to his text messages.40 Instead, working with
the assumption that Quon did have a reasonable expectation of privacy
in his text messages, the Court assumed that a search of text messages is
no different from a search of an office.4 '
It appeared that the Court hesitated to make a firm rule regarding
text messages because it was not clear as to the text message's place in
society.42 Different opinions were given by the Court as to whether
personal use of a company owned pager was appropriate.4 3 The Court
regarded the pager's popularity as the major issue in whether a
legitimate expectation of privacy in one could exist."
Given this popularity, the Court saw that society might see a pager
as a means of self-expression or self-identification.4 However, the
Court also recognized that the pager's popularity meant that employees
should probably have access to their own pagers, making company
owned pagers not necessary for personal needs.4 6 The Katz and
Olmstead cases were also brought up by the Court as examples of how
time can change society's perception of privacy. 47
Due to its unwillingness to delve into the sager's place in society,
the Court simply applied the O'Connor rule. The Court determined
that Petitioner's intention, to determine whether the overage charges
were the result of an insufficient character limit, satisfied O'Connor's
40. Id at 2629-30.
41. Id. at 2630. It is interesting that while much is made of Respondent's expectation of
privacy in his text messages, little is made about whether the O'Connor rule is appropriate here.
This is because both Petitioner and Respondent accepted that the principle of law from
O'Connor controlled the issue. Id. Perhaps if Respondent or Petitioner had argued differently,
the Court would have been forced to deal with the technology issues involved in the case more
directly.
42. Id. at 2630 "[T]he Court [has] difficulty predicting how employees' privacy
expectations will be shaped by ... changes or the degree to which society will be prepared to
recognize those expectations as reasonable." Id
43. Id. at 2629
44. Id. at 2630.
45. Id.
46. Id. The Court, however, also cites an amici brief which argues that employers often
expect or tolerate personal use of equipment by employees because it can increase worker
efficiency. Id at 2629-30. This seems logical, in that if a worker uses the same device to
conduct both personal and work-related activities, the worker may be able to respond more
efficiently to those work-related activities. However, the facts of the instant case provide a good
example of where an employee used an employer-given device so much, that it was essentially a
personal device.
47. Id. at 2629.
48. Id.

300

JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGYLAW&

POLICY

[Vol. 15

requirement that the employer's intrusion be for a non-investigatory,
work related purpose. 49 By finding this, the Court then had to ask
whether Petitioner's search was reasonable at its inception and in its
scope.50
The Court viewed Petitioner's desire to prevent unnecessary
spending by its employees as a legitimate work-related need.5 ' In
addition to being a reasonable way for Petitioner to determine whether
the character limit was sufficient, the Court also accepted Petitioner's
search as being reasonable in scope. 52 The Court highlighted that
Petitioner limited its review of the text messages to only those messages
which were sent or received during work hours, and only from two
months, instead of every overage.5 3
The Court rejected the Ninth Circuit's argument that Petitioner's
search was too intrusive because Petitioner had access to other ways of
determining whether the character limit was sufficient.5 4 The Court
refused to acknowledge the Ninth Circuit's assertion that only the least
intrusive search is allowed by the Fourth Amendment.5 5 This approach,
the Court warned, would open too many searches to hindsight-aided
evaluations by the judicial system.5 6
IV. ANALYSIS
The instant case opinion expresses a strong desire to avoid ruling on
issues that involve new or growing technologies. 7 Technology is
49. Id. at 2630.
50. Id. at 2631.
51. Id.
52. Id. 2631-32. Even though Respondent's expectation of privacy was assumed by the
Court, the extent of that expectation was still examined in order to determine the search's
intrusiveness. Id. at 2631. Respondent had been told prior to the audit that his messages could be
audited at anytime. Id. The Court also puts extra emphasis on Respondent's role as a police
officer. Id. "As a law enforcement officer, he would or should have known that his actions were
likely to come under legal scrutiny . . . ." Id. These factors helped to lower Respondent's
assumed expectation of privacy, giving Petitioner even more leeway in its audit of Respondent's
messages. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 2632. The lower court suggested that Petitioner could have simply warned
Respondent that his messages would be audited the following month and then audited those
messages to see if the character limit was sufficient. Id. Other suggestions by the lower court
were to ask Respondent to count the messages himself, or to redact personal messages from the
audit and supply Petitioner with the remaining messages. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 2629.
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becoming more and more entrenched in the lives of Americans, and it is
likely that the judiciary will see more cases concerning new technology.
It must be questioned whether it is wise for the Court to avoid tackling
these kinds of issues.
The Court hesitated because of the speed at which technology
moves.'a Technology can easily outpace the judicial system, and rulings
on an issue involving technology can become quickly outdated.
However, in expressing these doubts, the Court does not decide how
much firm ground it does need to make a decision. 59
Technologies can be born and die out in a relatively short amount of
time. Likewise, societal expectations about technology can fluctuate just
as quickly. If the judicial system refuses to rule on a fast moving
technology at present, then it may never feel secure enough to do so in
the future.
These results can be acceptable as long as the judicial system is
provided with cases like the instant case, which can be decided on other
grounds.60 Yet, when presented with cases where it is necessary to
decide an issue where technology is deeply involved, the courts cannot
simply avoid the issue. The Court in Quon offered a solution to this
problem by advising courts to make case-specific rulings in these
situations.
Justice Scalia's concurrence points out two potential problems with
this plan.6 2 First, Justice Scalia questions whether it is appropriate for
the Court to avoid ruling on an issue.63 Justice Scalia phrases this as a
"disregard of duty."6 Justice Scalia also sees this duty as forming
principles of law that serve to guide private action.65 If the Court avoids
an issue or rules in a way specific only to the facts of a case, private
action cannot be guided.
Secondly, Justice Scalia believes that in avoiding a tough issue
involving technology or making a case-specific ruling, the Court will
still lead lower courts toward following the precedent set in the case.6 7
58. Id
59. See id "A broad holding concerning employees' privacy expectations .. . might have
implications for future cases that cannot be predicted. It is preferable to dispose of this case on
narrower grounds." Id. at 2630.
60. See id.
61. See id at 2629.
62. Id. at 2635 (Scalia, J., concurring).
63. Id. "The-times-they-are-a-changin' is a feeble excuse for a disregard of duty." Id
64. Id.
65. Id
66. See id
67. Id. "[L]ower courts will likely read the Court's self-described 'instructive' expatiation
on how the O'Connor plurality's approach would apply here (if it applied) as a heavy-handed
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In refusing to tackle the issue of whether Quon had a legitimate
expectation of privacy, the Court handed down a ruling that assumes the
O'Connor rule applied to the instant case facts.6 8 Justice Scalia argues
that in applying this rule, the Court is setting precedent that may not be
a correct principle of law, but will nevertheless shape future litigation.69
The Court also put a strong emphasis on the societal expectations of
electronic devices. The Court wanted to avoid making a ruling where
71
expectations may change. In Olmstead, the Court refused to uphold an
expectation of privacy concerning use of a phone. 72 Katz, however, saw
the Court protect what it believed to be a legitimate expectation of
privacy in communications from a phone.7 3 In the instant case, the
Court pointed out these contrary opinions as situations where it would
avoid having decided a technological issue. 74 The Court even suggested
that if the phone privacy issue were heard today, it might even have a
different outcome.7 5
V. CONCLUSION

The Quon Court created a dangerous precedent in its decision to
avoid ruling on whether Quon had a legitimate expectation of privacy.
While the facts easily allowed the Court to decide the case through
another avenue, the idea that the judicial system should avoid ruling on
issues deeply rooted in growing technologies should be questioned.
At first glance, such advice seems useful. It allows courts to let
society develop concrete expectations in a technology's use.76 However,
these concrete expectations may not form, due to the pace technology
hint about how they should proceed." Id. (internal citation omitted).
68. Id. at 2630 (majority opinion).
69. Id. at 2635 (Scalia, J., concurring). "Litigants will ... [use] the threshold question [of]
whether the Fourth Amendment is even implicated as a basis for bombarding lower courts with
arguments about employer policies, how they were communicated, and whether they were
authorized, as well as the latest trends in employees' use of electronic media." Id. It is
interesting that Justice Scalia sees this as problematic when he argues that instead of questioning
whether the Fourth Amendment applies to messages on public employee-issued pagers but to
any employee-issued pagers. It is likely that in opening the door to all employee-issued devices
similar arguments would be brought into court.
70. Id. at 2630 (majority opinion).
71. Id.
72. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 465 (1928).
73. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1967).
74. Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2629.
75. Id.
76. See id.
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sets.77 Issues can also arise that cannot be put off or ruled on a casespecific basis.
It is unlikely that the Supreme Court will ever be capable of
understanding all the complexities of cutting edge technology.78
However, the Justices of the Supreme Court are placed on the bench to
serve the people of the United States.7 9 We expect the Justices to rule in
ways that are logical and based on the lifestyle of the average citizen.
It is not hard to imagine ideas concerning technology changing over
time. 0 The decisions in Olmstead and Katz do not hinge on the
technical intricacies of the phone, but on society's expectation of
privacy.81 The Court in Olmstead found it implausible that a man using
a phone to speak to another outside the building might claim his calls to
be private. The Court in Katz recognized that even in public, the
phone is not used for a public purpose.8 3 Each Court reflected the
opinion that it believed the average citizen at that time would agree
with.
It may be argued that the instant case differs from Olmstead and
Katz, in that the telephone had existed for much longer in both cases.
Yet, telephones had gained widespread popularity some twenty years
before the decision in Olmstead, and similarly text messages have been
available to the public for nearly fifteen years before the decision in

Quon.84
The Supreme Court has regularly held principles of law that were
later overturned.8 5 If at each time the court is simply reflecting society's
77. For instance, there have been many media format technologies (HD-DVD, Laser
Discs, Beta-Max) that were created and discontinued in relatively short order. As product cycles
shorten due to the speed of innovation, it is likely that this may occur with even greater
frequency.
78. This seems especially true with life-expectancies ever increasing. As Supreme Court
Justices are given life terms and the position seems to be increasingly more politically oriented,
many Justices can be expected to serve far into their old age. It is unfortunate that while we may
place Justices on the bench with good intentions, they may inevitably grow disconnected from
American society as a whole.
79. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
80. This is even more striking when we consider the effect the cell phone has had on the
telephone. As the cell phone grows more popular, more people are forgoing the traditional
telephone installation.
81. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1967); Olmstead v. United States,
277 U.S. 438,465 (1928).
82. Olnutead,277 U.S. at 465.
83. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351-53.
84. ANTON A. HUURDEMAN, THE WORLDWIDE HISTORY OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS 181
(2003). "At the end of the nineteenth century, access to a telephone was available in most urban
centers . . . ."
85. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), overruled by Ferguson v. Skrupa, 32
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wishes, it seems unlikely that it can be criticized. Likewise, while the
Supreme Court may feel that expectations regarding text messages may
change in the future, it must still make principles of law that apply
today.

U.S. 726 (1963); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Board of
Educ. 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877), overruled by Collins v.
Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37 (1990).

